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I. INTRODUCTION
Cross-border business transactions are complex. But in this globalized
age, as commentators such as Ohmae have argued,1 business ought to be
conducted simply despite national boundaries. Yet there are features of
business that run counter to globalization and maintain a resolutely local
character. A crucial aspect of this is the nature of law. No transaction can
be carried out without a normative structure to provide a framework for the
actors to operate within. Obligations, rights, warranties, covenants, and so
on have to be specified and allocated. Even economists agree that the rule
of law is essential for the conduct of business.2 States, however, jealously
guard their legal systems and resist incursions in their jurisdictions by
others.3 No matter the level of "hyperlegality" states adopt, they will
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I KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES
(1995).
2 OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).
3 Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law, or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Differences, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF LAW: THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 243, 243-44 (Francis Snyder ed., 2000).
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always be incapable of providing all the necessary support structures for
cross-border business. Our thesis is that although states' legal systems are a
basic necessary condition, they are no longer a sufficient condition for
transnational business and enterprise, because a large part of states' work
has been transferred to and commandeered by other institutions-most
notably, the internationally-operating law firms.
We present this from the double perspective of Niklas Luhmann's
ideas of the stabilization of normative expectations and Ronald Gilson's
conception of the lawyer as transaction-cost engineer.4 While these two
approaches appear to diverge, they actually reinforce each other and help us
explain what it is that lawyers and law firms do in cross-border transactions.
We begin our paper with a discussion of our theoretical standpoint,
which we follow with a survey of the corporate law firm, detailing its
structure and role in the modem economy, which includes examples of the
types of transactions that are handled by such firms. These are derived
from fieldwork carried out by the authors in the United Kingdom and
Germany.5 Finally, we attempt to reformulate our theory in the light of the
empirical work and indicate where we consider further research should be
carried out.
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
A. Stabilizing Expectations through Typified Solutions
The basic problem of any exchange lies in the insecurity that
characterizes any interaction. Most institutional approaches view the
problem of opportunism as the central problem in any exchange situation.
There is always the danger that parties will not behave in cooperative ways,
because they prefer to do what renders the highest profit to them. Thus,
mechanisms are necessary to develop stable expectations with regard to the
behavior of interaction partners. According to Max Weber, only the state
can provide stable expectations structures in modern economies.6 However,
according to other institutional approaches such as the empirical contract
theory,7 institutional economics, relationship management,9 or the
4 NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 109 (Martin Albrow ed.,
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 253-56 (1984).
5 Flood has carried out interviews and observation in large law firms in London; Sosa
undertook participant observation with a bi-national law firm in Germany.
6 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF AN INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
328-29 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
7 IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
8 WILLIAMSON, supra note 2.
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network-approach,' ° stable expectations with regard to the behavior of an
exchange partner are developed on the basis of non-legal structures such as
networks or business relationships. Non-institutional approaches argue that
the problem of cooperation cannot be reduced to the problem of
opportunistic behavior. Interaction between two human beings involves the
problem of double contingency: in order to coordinate interaction, ego has
to be able to expect the behavior of alter as well as the expectations alter
has with regard to ego's behavior. It is therefore at the reflexive level of
"expectations of expectations" that the problem of orientation of behavior,
as well as the strategies for handling disappointments, has to be defined and
solved. According to Niklas Luhmann, it is possible to react to
disappointments in cognitive or normative ways. In the first case,
expectations are adapted to reality when disappointed. In the second case,
expectations are not adapted." Luhmann even observed a clear prevalence
of cognitive expectations in some global interaction fields such as science
and economics. However, even if cognitive expectations play a central role
in the coordination of many transactions, it is most unlikely that exchange is
possible without any normative expectations, which are among the concerns
of this article.
Following Luhmann, the stabilization of normative expectations can
occur at different levels: persons, roles and programs. While most of the
current literature still supports Max Weber's thesis that the state legal
system provides the central support structure in modern economies, the
stabilization of behavioral expectations on the basis of general legal
provisions (programs) is possible only if adequate legal structures exist,
which is questionable in the international context. Consequently, the
stabilization of normative expectations will be integrated at a lower level of
abstraction; professional roles will have a particular significance, even
when general programs seem to be at play.
B. Incompleteness and Weakness of Legal Systems in the International
Context
National legal systems fail to work efficiently in many circumstances
and many transactions are actually coordinated by non-legal structures.
Still, in a national context actors usually have the possibility to resort to the
state legal system in an endgame situation. This is completely different in
the international context, where the development of a global legal system is
9 Robert M. Morgan & Shelby D. Hunt, The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship
Marketing, 58 J. MARKETING 20 (2000).
10 Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985) (discussing the extent to which, in modem
industrial society, economic action is embedded in structures of social relations).
11 LUHMANN, supra note 4, at 42-43.
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unlikely at the present moment despite the explosion in "mid-level treaties"
involving such areas as investment and intellectual property. The efforts of
the nation-states to create unified law are obvious, but the number of
conventions that have actually been ratified by a sufficient number of
nations to come into force remains small. Nevertheless, it would be a
mistake to give up the legal approach too early. Shapiro assumes that a
global commercial law can come into existence by the creation of a
relatively uniform set of contract provisions. 12 Parties may also resort to
arbitral tribunals or national courts to resolve their disputes. This approach
is also supported by the enormous success of international law firms, which
create complex contracts that work as a system of private government
largely freestanding of any national jurisdiction.
But a closer analysis of the existing international legal structures
reveals that this system is very weak and fragmentary, which is also
supported by empirical findings showing that the percentage of cases taken
to court is considerably lower in the international context. 13  The
peculiarities of international transactions cannot be correctly taken into
account by national courts, because national legal systems do not leave
much scope for this. Existing legislation provides only the raw material for
legal structures, which has to be further developed and refined by judges
and law professors. But we can observe a lack of case law in the
international area, and legal science focuses mainly on the national context.
National legal systems have great difficulties in coping with new forms of
coordination, such as franchising, joint ventures or even supplier contracts.
Existing legislation does not take into consideration the uncertainty of
certain projects, the lack of concrete timetables, intense cooperation
between the parties, mutual information and control rights, or the structures
of economic dependence between the parties. 14  Courts cannot provide
expert knowledge in this area because disputes that arise out of long-term
and complex contracts are rarely taken to court. Another major problem is
posed by the practical difficulties in the enforcement of contractual claims,
which leads to a low level of effectiveness of the legal system in the
international context. Most practical problems with international civil
proceduresare well known: parties are confronted with two legal systems;
one party is always confronted with a foreign jurisdiction and a foreign
language; cooperation between lawyers can pose major problems; costs are
12 Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 39
(1993).
13 See e.g., Volkmar Gessner, International Cases in German First Instance Courts, in
FOREIGN COURTS: CIVIL LITIGATION IN FOREIGN LEGAL CULTURES 149, 155 (Volkmar
Gessner ed., 1996) (Table D-2, indicating the relative share of international cases in the
disctrict courts of Bremen and Hamburg in 1988).
14 JOACHIM G. FRICK, ARBITRATION AND COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 16
(2001).
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much higher; duration of proceedings, as well as time for preparation of the
process are longer; superficial knowledge of the judge about foreign legal
systems and international law lead to lower predictability of judgments,
etc. 5
Studies on the coordination of transactions in international business
show that many actors do not rely on legal structures.' 6  Instead, they
coordinate their transactions based on relational structures, in which
contracts play only a minor role for the realization of the transaction and the
resolution of conflicts. Many transactions are also coordinated within
networks of business relationships that guarantee a very high level of
stabilization of expectations. The current discussion focuses on networks
with a high level of institutionalization, 17 ethnic networks,' 8 and illegal
networks (e.g., organized crime syndicates in the Italian, Russian, and
Chinese contexts). But the transferability of this form of coordination to
other types of associations has not yet succeeded. It is very likely that
relational coordination structures will gain importance in an international
context, because legal coordination structures are less effective there than in
the national context. 19 On the other hand, it is obvious that relational
coordination structures cannot provide effective protection under all
circumstances. Many transactions are carried out between unknown actors
(spot market transactions), the establishment of long-term business
relationships is often not possible or will not provide sufficient protection
against opportunistic behavior because the value of the transaction is higher
than the value of the entire relationship (risk transactions) or because actors
have to make high specific investments at the beginning of a business
relationship (long-term or complex-long-term transactions). Finally, a
business relationship can break down, so that the relational mechanisms
will not function in an endgame situation. As a consequence, it is possible
to carry out many transactions without the support of legal structures, but
global exchange altogether will not work without some degree of support of
legal structures.
15 Gessner, supra note 13; FABIAN SOSA, VERTRAG UND GESCHAFTSBEZIEHUNG IM
GRENZOBERSCHREITENDEN WIRTSCHAFTSVERKEHR (2007), available at http://www.nomos.de
/nomos/d/recherche/titelrech/action.lasso?-database=titel. fp3&-layout-intemet&-response=
/nomos/d/recherche/titelrech/titdetail.lasso&ISBN 13=978-3-8329-2199-6&-search.
16 SOSA, supra note 15.
17 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
18 Janet Tai Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981).
19 SOSA, supra note 15.
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C. Stabilizing Expectations at the Level of the Law Firm
Because many companies have suffered negative experiences with
cross-border litigation, there is a tendency among traders to consider the
effectiveness of the legal system to be lower than it actually is. If
international actors cooperate with lawyers to realize a transaction or to
solve a conflict, the stabilization of expectations can occur only at the level
of the role of the lawyer and not at the level of the legal system. Actors do
not rely on the state legal system as a last resort. They rely on the
assumption that the lawyer who can make use of the international structures
of his law firm will be able to provide adequate legal or non-legal solutions
for any type of conflict that can arise out of the transaction. It makes no
difference if the lawyer is involved at the beginning of the transactions or if
he is only involved when a conflict arises because most large and mid-sized
companies are usually repeat players. The assumption that the role of
lawyers increases in significance when legal structures are more
fragmentary is also supported by a simple comparison between the role of
lawyers in civil-law and common-law countries. 20 In the civil-law context
we can find very well-developed legal structures at the level of the nation-
state, which means that lawyers largely work within these existing
structures. In contrast, in the common-law context legal structures are not
so well developed, which means that lawyers have to create their own
structures. This leads to an increase of the importance of lawyers in
comparison to civilian legal systems.
Luhmann defines the function of law as the stabilization of normative
expectations through regulation of its temporal, social and material
21generalization. According to Luhmann, norms are counterfactually
stabilized behavioral expectations. Their validity (Geltung) is independent
of actual fulfillment. Norms fix a rather narrow section of the possible as
achievable. Thus they are deceptive regarding the true complexity of the
world and remain liable to disappointments. In order to create stabilized
expectancy structures it is not only necessary to develop norms but also to
provide mechanisms for the handling of disappointments. Apart from
sanctions there are often other, functionally equivalent, strategies of
counterfactual stabilization. In a highly complex and contingent world it is
not possible to standardize (normieren) every single expectation. Social
behavior requires achievements in reduction which facilitate reciprocal
behavioral expectations. According to Luhmann, this occurs through
temporal, social and material generalization. In the temporal dimension the
structures of expectation can be stabilized by the development of explicit or
implicit norms and the preparation of mechanisms for the handling of
20 Lawrence M. Friedman, Lawyers in Cross-Cultural Perspective, in LAWYERS IN
SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 1 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989).
21 LuHMANN, supra note 4, at 78.
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disappointments. These structures of expectation can be institutionalized
within the social dimension; i.e., supported by the expected consensus of
third parties. With increasing social complexity the co-expectation of third
parties can no longer be guaranteed. This leads to a differentiation between
particular roles and procedures which have to decide about the law with
binding effect for the whole of society. These roles can be taken over by
judges or legislators. The structures of expectation can be fixed through
identical meaning within the material dimension. This presumes a
differentiation between four different levels of abstraction: persons, specific
roles (lawyers, judges), specific programs (norms), and values (fairness).
The unity of an individual person serves as guarantee for a context of
expectations particularly in intimate groups. A higher degree of abstraction
can be achieved at the next level: the identification of a context of
expectation upon the unity of a role-performer, which allows the
disregarding of the individual-personal characteristics. In a complex world
this supposes the institutionalization of roles, which occurs through
normative co-expectation of third parties, which is oriented toward the role.
A much higher degree of abstraction can be achieved if the context of
expectation is based on programs. Programs are valid for a plurality of
persons or roles, the degree of abstraction is variable, and programs can be
changed without persons or roles losing their identity. The sphere of values
has a very indeterminate complexity with regard to permitted action and is
therefore not suited for the generalization of behavioral expectations. The
mechanisms of temporal, social and material generalization are of
heterogeneous kind. They generalize varied and inconsistent expectations.
It is only after a certain period of time that congruently generalized
normative behavioral expectations are generated. Luhmann defines this
phenomenon as the law of a social system.
Typified solutions represent explicitly formulated behavioral
expectations. The stabilization of expectations in the temporal dimension
requires the preparation of mechanisms for the handling of
disappointments. Luhmann assumes that only sanctions can provide this
function in the course of legal development. But the enforceability of
sanctions in an atmosphere of low state legal certainty is limited. However,
according to Luhmann it is still possible to maintain expectations regardless
of factual enforcement, if the expectation is formulated under threat of a
sanction and if parties are aware of the possibility of a sanction. Typified
solutions can provide this function because they generate the appearance of
a legal instrument. Typified solutions are formulated in a legal language:
rights and obligations of the parties are supplemented by extensive
warranties, delay, renegotiation, default, and termination clauses. The
appearance of enforceability is generated by the use of choice of law,
jurisdiction, and arbitration clauses. Contracts symbolize legal structures.
The symbolic function of contracts has already been described in another
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context by Suchman,22 and the work of Flood suggests a similar
standpoint. 3 Lawyers also simulate the proximity of the state legal system
when they use typified solutions to resolve conflicts. The reference of a
case to a lawyer is considered by the parties as an essential step towards a
legal solution; i.e., judicial enforcement cannot be completely excluded.
From a legal perspective, amicable arrangements represent contracts as
well. Typified conflict solutions are documented in a legal language.
For Luhmann, social generalization occurs through the differentiation
of specific roles and procedures. In the area of typified solutions these roles
can be assumed by international business lawyers. Expectations are
generated by the clients, but it is the lawyer who transforms these
expectations into typified solutions. As a consequence, lawyers play a
decisive role in the development of normative expectations. The procedure
for the development of typified solutions is less formalized than a court
procedure. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a concrete structure:
lawyers first compare and then combine different national typified
solutions. In doing so, reference to the national legal systems has to be
maintained. These references guarantee a high degree of acceptance of the
typified solutions. Parties are involved in the process of the development of
typified solutions, which ignites a learning process that makes it possible
for the parties to accept the typified solutions. This occurs even though
they may have had different solutions in mind when the process started.
The development of unified typified solutions requires a high level of
expert knowledge with regard to national typified solutions in different
countries, as well as the particularities of international trade. Only large
and medium-sized law firms that provide an appropriate structure can
develop typified solutions. The social validity of these typified solutions
can be guaranteed through three factors: maintenance of a reference to
national legal systems; a relatively uniform process of development of
typified solutions; and a differentiation of specific roles for the
development of typified solutions. As a result, we can assume that typified
solutions can generate congruently-generalized normative behavioral
expectations as well, which will function autonomously in an atmosphere of
low state legal certainty. Ultimately, these unified typified solutions
represent a form of the new lex mercatoria.
Whereas Luhmann does not focus on the work of law firms it is
necessary to resort to current law firm literature to describe the
development and function of typified solutions in international law firm
practice. Several approaches in current law firm literature indicate that
22 See generally Mark Suchman, Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 91
(2003).
23 John Flood, International Law Firms: Guardians of Globalization (2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
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lawyers do not operate within an existing legal framework but that they
provide much more complex structures to support (cross-border)
transactions. Well-known concepts from this literature are those of creative
lawyering,24 the concept of the lawyer as legal entrepreneur or legal
lawynn~,26
engineer, ' the lawyer as manager of uncertainty, and the lawyer as
transaction cost engineer.27 These structures may replace, simulate or
integrate state legal structures. But the core elements of the support
structures described by these authors are created by lawyers and not by the
state.
D. Creating Value with Lawyers through the Transaction
In this article we will use Gilson's approach to analyze where the
creation of typified solutions takes place and what form they take. Gilson
tells us where to look for the creative elements of business lawyers' work.28
He takes as his starting point the transaction as framed by capital asset
pricing theory. The theory states that risk-averse investors will always hold
a diversified portfolio of capital assets. 29 The level of systematic risk will
determine the asset's value and the market will function efficiently, leaving
no role for the business lawyer. Implicit in the theory are two assumptions
that state there are no transaction costs and that all information is available
without cost to all investors.3° Since these assumptions, and the others that
underlie capital asset pricing theory, cannot hold in the real world their
failure provides the opportunity for the business lawyer to enter the
transaction and create value instead of diminishing it. The lawyer creates a
structure for the transaction that enables the parties to act as if the
assumptions of the theory were accurate. 3  The lawyer becomes a
transaction cost engineer. In taking a standard form acquisition agreement,
Gilson illustrates the points at which the lawyer makes the most significant
contributions. These are within the construction of the transaction
agreement, especially representations, warranties, covenants, and
24 Doreen McBamet, Legal Creativity: Law, Capital and Legal Avoidance, in LAWYERS
IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 73 (Maureen Cain & Christine Harrington eds., 1994); Michael
Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking, 18 J. L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 423 (1993).
25 Doreen McBarnet, The Construction of Legal Devices: Legal Entrepreneurs and
Private Law Making (1987) (abstract presented in Law and Society Association Conference,
Washington, D.C., paper on file with authors).
26 John Flood, Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyer's Work, 25
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 41 (1991).
27 Gilson, supra note 4.
28 id.
29 Id. at 250.
30 Id. at 252.
3' Id. at 253.
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conditions. These aspects concern timing of payments, earn-out structures,
information procurement and so on, and are the points where the
assumptions of the theory depart from reality. In addition to these internal
elements, there are regulatory hurdles the parties may have to overcome,
which will also include the tax issues in the agreement. 32  Again, the
lawyer's role is vital here. Much of this work is not primarily legal in a
doctrinal sense, but works within the penumbra of the law. Indeed, Gilson
reinforces the lawyer's role when he writes:
The critical importance of transactional structure for purposes of
regulation provides the core of an explanation for lawyers'
domination of the role of transaction cost engineer. Because the
lawyer must play an important role in designing the structure of the
transaction in order to assure the desired regulatory treatment,
economies of scope should cause the nonregulatory aspects of
transactional structuring to gravitate to the lawyer as well.
33
Lawyers, for Gilson, are undertaking, at the minimum, two tasks. The
first is designing the structure of the transaction so that it stages and paces
the evolution of the transaction over a life course to completion. The
second is to represent this structure in a set of documents that encapsulate
the entirety of the actors' intentions and behaviors. At any point where a
breakdown occurs in the parties' future conduct, it is the structure as
idealized by the documentation that will determine the potential outcomes.
Thus lawyers have advantages over other professionals involved in the
transaction-such as investment bankers and accountants-because lawyers
possess the capacity to create typified solutions which do not rely on direct
state intervention. The work of the lawyer has the significant symbolic role
we mentioned above.
This is observable in the example of the takeover of the Safeway
supermarket chain in the United Kingdom by another, Morrisons.3 4 What
started as a recommended takeover, one to which both parties had agreed,
soon turned into a five-way battle as others scented the potential of the
takeover. The lawyers with the investment bankers had initially arranged a
consensual rapprochement between bidder and target, but since these
transactions are publicized, an opening is created for other bidders to make
32 John Flood & Eleni Skordaki, Structuring Transactions: The Case of Real Estate
Finance, in LEGAL CERTAINTY BEYOND THE STATE? AUTONOMOUS STRUCTURES IN
GLOBALIZED EXCHANGE PROCESSES (Volkmar Gessner ed., forthcoming 2008).
33 Id. at 297-98 (citations omitted). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value
of Transactional Lawyering, DUKE LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES,
RESEARCH PAPER No. 108 (2007) (arguing that value is added primarily by reducing
regulatory costs).
34 Husnara Begum, The Battle for Safeway, THE LAWYER (London), Apr. 2004, at 26.
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counter-offers, usually higher than the original.35 When this occurs the
target's board of directors can no longer support the first bid because of
their fiduciary duty. Since the deal involved the United Kingdom's largest
supermarket groups the Office of Fair Trading ("OFT") insisted on
submissions from each bidder on the competition (antitrust) concerns
raised. These regulatory issues had the potential to derail the deal, thus the
lawyers had to craft their OFT submissions carefully. Three of the bidders
would have acquired a market share of more than twenty percent and were
therefore blocked by the regulator from bidding. After dropouts and blocks
the original parties remained in play. The lawyers constructed a scheme of
arrangement which involved the target's share capital being cancelled and
replaced by that of the bidder.36 Because the takeover moved from being a
straightforward takeover to that of a scheme of arrangement, the regulatory
rules changed also. Under takeover rules the Takeover Code, the Takeover
Panel determines the parties' timetable. A scheme moves the action from
the Takeover Panel to a court which approves the scheme. Using a scheme
avoids large tax liabilities such as stamp duty (transfer tax) on share
transfers. The lawyers' roles were to construct a series of typified solutions
that created a symbolic order that harmonized regulatory structures,
including tax, with the parties' expectations for the new business. Because
of external interferences their role was amplified as further regulatory and
financial issues came to the fore. Timelines were extended from a matter of
a few months under the recommended takeover to a year and three months
under the contested situation. It was the lawyers' expertise in these
different but concurrent areas that permitted the takeover to proceed: they
acted proactively in creating structures and reactively in dealing with the
exigencies of the regulatory frameworks.
These are the two complementary elements of our theory. The first is
demand for stability of expectations aroused in the parties to the
transaction, which is achieved through the production of typified solutions.
And the second is the deployment of the expertise of transaction cost
engineering by the lawyer in the course of the transaction that ultimately
creates value within typified solutions thus meeting the parties'
expectations.
III. THE STRUCTURES, CONTEXTS, AND ROLE OF LAW FIRMS
37
Corporate law firms have dominated the field of international business
law. The range of law firms we include in this study range from medium-
35 See generally LAWRENCE LEDERMAN, TOMBSTONES: A LAWYER'S TALES FROM THE
TAKEOVER DECADES (1992).
36 See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 425 (Eng.).
37 See John Flood, Law Firms, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 924 (David Clark ed., 2007).
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sized firms in Germany and Spain to large law firms in the United Kingdom
and the United States. Despite their differences in size-for example, DLA
Piper has 3,700 lawyers and Clifford Chance numbers over 3,000 lawyers
worldwide, while many mid-range firms number around 250 or more
lawyers-the essence of the work undertaken varies little. There are of
course significant differences in scale and scope, but the forms are similar.
The majority of law firms are formed by partnership and are typically
flat-profiled organizations composed of partners and associates. Others
may be run as franchises or as more hierarchical and autocratic structures.
Some law firms can trace their histories for hundreds of years; for example,
Freshfields became solicitors to the Bank of England in 1743.38 But some
countries, such as Greece, have only allowed the formation of law firms
since the 1990s, and in other countries like England and Wales parts of the
legal profession, e.g., barristers, prohibit the creation of law firm
partnerships.39
Law firms have come in many shapes and sizes in the late twentieth
century. In particular, in the United States and the United Kingdom the
legal profession was marked by the growth of corporate large law firms that
measure their lawyers in the thousands and have scores of offices around
the world. While they are primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon, large
law firms have taken root elsewhere in the world. Today several European
firms number over 500 lawyers. But it is difficult to compare the growth of
U.S. and U.K. firms to the development of law firms in continental Europe
because most European firms remained relatively small until the 1990s.
For example, in Germany the largest "law firms" have traditionally been the
in-house counsel of large companies (e.g., Deutsche Bank with 100
lawyers, Siemens with seventy-five lawyers, Volkswagen with thirty
lawyers, and Bayer with twenty-four lawyers).40 The current situation in
Europe indicates that European law firms have not simply copied the
American model, but that they have developed different strategies to
corporate lawyering in the national as well as the international context.
A. Roots
No definitive start date can be assigned to law firms, but historians
have found records of partnerships existing, such as two or three-man
partnerships, in England in 1780. The great majority of lawyers, however,
were solo practitioners. Industrialization was one of the main incentives to
the development of law practice in both the United States and Europe.
38 JUDY SLINN, A HISTORY OF FRESHFIELDS 11-12 (1984).
39 But see Legal Services Act, 2007, c.29 (Eng.).
40 Richard Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 737, 801 (1994)
(citing to statistics in Chris Darbyshire, In-House, In Fashion, 9 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 20, 20, 22
(1990)).
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Landed gentry began to exploit their latent natural resources, which brought
lawyers into the business of creating businesses and raising finance for
them. Big enterprises, like the formation of the railroads, demanded an
array of legal skills in finance, corporate structures, and bankruptcy, which
lawyers were able to offer.
The spirit of enterprise was fostered by permissive and facilitative
legislation such as the British Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 and the
Limited Liability Act of 1855. Regulation was limited and fraud rife. The
City of London became a hive of inventive activity as investment trusts
were born and foreign bonds issued.4 1 As railways extended their lines, law
firms were involved in forming companies, acquiring land, petitioning
Parliament, and resolving contract disputes. For example, the London firm
of Norton Rose maintained twenty-three railway company accounts
between 1848 and 1878. These law firms had small numbers of partners:
two or three were the norm. But they were buttressed by large numbers of
managing clerks, unqualified men, at ratios of partners to clerks of between
1:20 and 1:100. The railway business gave lawyers considerable
experience in risk management, investment strategy, and trust
administration, both domestically and abroad.42
However, nineteenth-century New York City is the true birthplace of
the modern law firm. Both legal education and law firms transformed
themselves to become meritocratic and rational institutions based on
scientific principles, with law schools adopting the case method devised by
Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard, and Paul D. Cravath evolving
his law firm organically by selecting partners from the finest associates
trained within the firm.4
As law firms changed from small, parochial partnerships into large,
complex, diverse organizations, mirroring the growth of economies, the
expression "law factory" materialized and tensions within the profession
opened up so that Julius Henry Cohen, for example, published a small book
in 1916 titled Law: Business or Profession?44 Law firm histories show
New York law firms growing rapidly. Sullivan & Cromwell had over 200
lawyers by the 1930s, causing Karl Llewellyn to caution us about law
41 YOUSSEF CASSIS, CAPITALS OF CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
CENTRES, 1780-2005, 96-97, 221-22 (Jacqueline Collier trans., 2006).
42 ANDREW ST. GEORGE, A HISTORY OF NORTON ROSE (1995). Even though managing
clerks were unqualified in the formal sense, they possessed enormous experience, the
equivalent of a partner. Thus in today's terms, the leverage ratios here could be expressed in
terms of partners and associates or junior partners.
43 Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870-2000, in CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2008).
44 Cf Gerald Fetner, Public Power and Professional Responsibility: Julius Henry Cohen
and the Origins of the Public Authority, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 15, 15-39 (1977). See also
JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THEY BUILDED BETTER THAN THEY KNEW (Julian Messner 1948).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:489 (2008)
factories mopping up all the best lawyers leaving too few to do the
remaining "law jobs" in society.45 The expansion of the imperial world
brought with it international development for law firms as demonstrated by
John Foster Dulles of Sullivan & Cromwell. He played a key role in the
negotiations of the Versailles Treaty at the end of the First World War and
his firm subsequently helped capital flow from North America to Europe,
especially to Germany aiding the National Socialist government.
46
In the period since the Second World War, however, not only have the
numbers of lawyers grown significantly but the numbers of large law firms
have expanded along with the size of these firms. The most dynamic
growth has taken place in the large law firm sector,47 while small law firms,
though containing the largest number of lawyers, have declined in strength
as the changing economics of practice militate against them.
B. Context
In England and Wales in 2006, the Law Society estimated that there
were around 8,900 law firms with 27% of them based in London. Eighty-
seven percent of all law firms had four or fewer partners and within this
segment, 46% of firms were solo practitioners. Firms with more than
twenty-six partners (1.3% of the whole), however, were increasing in
number and 60% of these were located in London. Mega-law firms, which
accommodate 20% of all practicing lawyers, were virtually all London-
based. There were also 155 multi-national practices in England and
Wales.48
The American Bar Association data for 2000 tell us there were over
one million lawyers, 75% of whom practiced in 47,563 law firms in the
United States. Firms of one to five lawyers comprised 76% of all law
firms, while firms with more than twenty lawyers comprised 24% (101+
lawyer firms comprise 14%). While the number of law firms has
increased-in 1980 there were 38,500 and in 1991 there were 42,500-the
rise has been at the expense of the smaller firms, which in 1981 were 81%
of law firms.49
45 Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results? 176 ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 177, 177-92 (1933).
46 NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK LIPSIuS, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
LAW FIRM SULLIVAN & CROMWELL (1988).
47 Peter D. Sherer, Projecting the Future of Large US Law Firms: The Scale and Scope of
Things to Come, presented at The Future of the Global Law Firm Symposium, Georgetown
University Law Center, Center for the Study of the Legal Profession, April 17-18, 2008 (on
file with authors).
48 BILL COLE, TRENDS IN THE SOLICITORS' PROFESSION: ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT
2006 23 (2007), available at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/secure/file/163874/163874.pdf.
49 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2006), http://www.abanet.org
/marketresearch/lawyer demographics_2006.pdf.
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The United Kingdom and the United States have shown similar trends
in the year-on-year decline in the overall numbers of smaller law firms.
Small firms are shrinking in number while larger firms are growing in size
if not so much in quantity. When these movements are linked with the
trend of increasing numbers of applicants to the legal profession each year,
this suggests that there is consolidation of law firms occurring. The biggest
growth has been in large law firms: there are a substantial number of law
firms with over 1,000 lawyers. However, even the largest law firms are
tiny compared to the large accounting firms, such as
PricewaterhouseCoopers, which has over 146,000 professionals on staff
worldwide, in 766 offices in 150 countries.5 °
The statistics for lawyers across Europe show wildly divergent
numbers. For example, Germany has about 116,000 lawyers; France over
40,000; Italy 140,000; and Belgium 12,600 lawyers, which seems to
indicate that population size is not a reliable indicator of the numbers of
lawyers. Moreover, in these countries the typical law firm is small; for
example, in France, the average law firm numbers 2.73 lawyers. There are
occasional large law firms, like NautaDutilh of Amsterdam with 500
lawyers. Beyond Europe, statistics are scant, but in a country such as
China, there are 110,000 lawyers with more than 10,000 domestic law firms
and around 160 international law firms with offices in China.
C. The U.S. and U.K. Perspective: Law Firm Growth, Tournaments,
Mergers, and Clients
It is clear that law firms in the United States and the United Kingdom
have grown in size and appear to possess a dynamic for growth. A number
of causes have been adduced to explain this growth. Galanter and Palay
argue that there is a tournament at the heart of law firms which provides the
reason. Law firm partners are endowed with capital. The best way to
exploit their capital is to hire associates who will share in it and expand the
work base. This is known as leveraging and creates profit for the partners.
However, only a proportion of those associates can be promoted to partner,
in order to maintain the partner-associate ratios, so they engage in a
tournament to discover which ones will succeed. Those who become
partners will have invested heavily in the firm and hence will be committed
to staying. This is close to the Cravath model outlined above. The law firm
therefore contains its own engine of growth and soon becomes identified
with exponential growth.
The model has attracted critics. Some say growth rates among law
50 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PEOPLE: 2007 ANNUAL REVIEW: PWC, http://www.pwc
.com/extweb/home.nsf/docid/B21B 1 EC59580DADA8525734600605184.
51 MARC GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (Univ. of Chicago Press 1991).
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firms are too varied to be explained by a single model. Moreover, many
law firms are introducing more layers between associate and partner, such
as "salaried partner" or "nonequity partner," thereby extending the tenure
track.52  Other suggestions propose that firms have incentives to become
"one-stop shops" for their clients, cross-selling services across a number of
areas so clients rely on single firms for all legal work. Another is law firms
grow by offering a large array of services to a large range of clients to avoid
becoming dependent on a single client or a particular type of work. To this
extent the Anglo-American large law firm model is becoming more
pyramidal with a shrinking equity partnership.53
Many law firms have grown through mergers. In some cases these are
marriages of equals and in others they are effectively takeovers. One of the
key mergers that sparked a rush to merge among law firms was between
Clifford-Turner and Coward Chance in the late 1980s: the corporate and
banking firms were galvanized by the deregulation of financial services-
the "Big Bang" in London in the mid-1980s.54 The result grew into the
United Kingdom's largest law firm, Clifford Chance. In the 1990s Clifford
Chance then undertook a three-way merger with Piinder Volhard of
Frankfurt and Rogers & Wells of New York, producing one of the world's
biggest law firms. The other big global law firm, Baker & McKenzie, took
a different route. It started in the late 1940s in Chicago with the intention
of becoming a firm with global reach.55 The process was to acquire lawyers
in each target country to form a firm that was a partnership within the local
jurisdiction but also a part of an international partnership. Over a period of
fifty years, Baker & McKenzie achieved what Clifford Chance attained in
fifteen through aggressive mergers and acquisitions.
While the rise of the large law firm has been on the basis of a full-
service provision one other law firm should be considered in this context,
52 William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier
Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1746 (2006). Moreover, some
scholars argue that associates are being divided into two tiers, one on the partner track and
the other not; see David Wilkins & Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Market of Elite Law
Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998). See also Marc Galanter & William D. Henderson, The
Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
53 One effect of changing patterns of employment is the rise in part-time lawyers who are
disproportionately women. See Empirical Legal Studies: Gender and Part-time Law Firm
Employment, http://www.elsblog.org/the-empirical-legal-studi/2007/12/unpacking-gende.
html (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
54 John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and Economic
Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 INT'L J. OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 169, 178-79
(1996) [hereinafler Flood, Megalawyering].
55 JON R. BAUMAN, PIONEERING A GLOBAL VISION: THE STORY OF BAKER & MCKENZIE
(Harcourt Prof. Educ. Group 1999).
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namely, Skadden Arps of New York. In its early years the firm was largely
Jewish, and because of the discrimination against Jews in the United States,
Skadden was consigned to mainly marginal legal work.56 During the 1960s
and '70s Skadden earned a reputation for aggressive lawyering in hostile
mergers and acquisitions ("M&A"), such work being shunned by the
mainstream law firms. From this basis Skadden was able to evolve from
being merely an M&A law firm to a full-service one. The firm became
renowned for engaging in high-profile transactions such as the $25 billion
leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco by the private equity firm Kohlberg
Kravis Roberts.57
Perhaps the significant feature of the emergence of law firms like
Skadden Arps and Wachtell Lipton,58 another Jewish M&A firm, was the
manner in which they altered the structure of lawyer-client relationships.
Until the 1980s, corporate clients' relationships with their legal counselors
were of longstanding duration. Some of the relationships between law
firms and investment banks go back more than a hundred years, based on
social as well as economic links. Because of the highly sought-after skills
that a firm like Skadden possessed in proxy fights, any corporation
enmeshed in a hostile takeover would not be able to rely on the abilities of
their normal law firm. It simply would not possess that experience. The
corporation would attempt to retain Joe Flom of Skadden or Marty Lipton
of Wachtell, the key players in the field. Thus notice was served on
longstanding lawyer-client relationships in favor of transactional
relationships. Two other changes reinforced this alteration in style.
Corporations took more of their legal work in-house and corporate legal
counsel became more selective about which law firm they chose, tightly
monitoring budgets and bills. Law firms ceased to be the stable structures
they traditionally had hitherto been. Instead of partners remaining with the
same firm throughout their careers, they began to move from firm to firm
seeking greater advantages, taking their clients with them.
Nowadays, the corporate field is largely dominated by large firms. The
large firms were the only ones that had the capacities to expand their work
to the international context. In contrast, the role of midsized and smaller
firms in the area of corporate and international work remained small in the
Anglo-American context.
56 LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE
(1993).
57 BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR-
NABISCO (Harper & Row 1990).
58 William H. Starbuck, Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Cards: The
Elements of Exceptional Success, 30 J. MGMT. STUD. 885.
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D. The European Perspective: "Americanization" of the Legal Market or
Development of a European Approach to Corporate and International
Lawyering?
While the English and American law firms have aggressively moved
into countries like Germany and merged with local law firms or established
their own offices with German lawyers, the Anglo-Saxon model has met
with resistance from European firms. 59  The German market has gone
through tremendous changes in the last fifteen years, but it would be wrong
to characterize this development as the "Americanization" of the legal
market that has been proclaimed by authors like Shapiro or Trubek. A
closer look reveals that U.K. and U.S. firms exercise a dominant position
only in specific areas.
Germany is the most important economy in continental Europe and
one of the leading export nations world-wide: however-similar to other
continental European countries-law firms are still relatively small. Only
eleven firms have more than 200 lawyers in their German offices. Another
twelve firms have more than 100 lawyers. 60 The presence of U.K. and U.S.
firms varies at different levels of the legal market. At the level of large
firms that advise multinational and large national companies, U.S. and U.K.
firms have taken over an important position: five of the ten largest firms are
from the United States or the United Kingdom (Clifford Chance, 373
lawyers; Linklaters, 343 lawyers; Lovells, 286 lawyers; Taylor Wessing,
267 lawyers; White & Case, 249 lawyers).61 Most of these firms merged
with German firms to expand their global reach: Clifford Chance has
merged with Piinder; Lovell & White with Boesebeck Droste,62 and
Linklaters with Oppenhoff.63 All these mergers were not made on equal
terms. Some of these firms have created alliances before they decided to
transform into a singe firm. Oppenhoff and Linklaters were part of
Linklaters & Alliance before they decided to merge in 2001 .65
59 Derek Bedlow, Independents' Day, LEGAL WEEK (London), Nov. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.legalweek.com/Articles/1 073750/IndependentsE2%80%99+Day.html.
60 JUVE HANDBUCH WIRTSCHAFTSKANZLEIEN: RECHTSANWALTE FOR UNTERNEHMEN 10,
AUFLAGE 2007/2008, available at http://www.juve.de/cgi-bin/juve/hbportal.cgi?year=2006
&lang=2 [hereinafter JUVE].
61 Id.
62 Martin Henssler & Laurel Terry, Lawyers Without Frontiers-A View From Germany,
19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269, 277-78 (2001).
63 Linklaters, History, http://www.linklaters.com/locations/germany/english/newsand
deals/newspresslist.asp?localnavigationid=1425 (last visited May 1, 2008).
64 The former Alliance of European Lawyers included Oppenhoff & Rdidler (Germany),
De Bandt Van Hecke (Belgium), Jeantet & Associ6s (France), De Brauw Blackstone
Westbroek (Netherlands), Uria & Menendez (Spain), Lagerl6f & Leman (Sweden), and
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On the other hand, the largest firm in the German market, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer (572 lawyers), has resulted from the first merger
between a U.K. and a German firm on equal terms. About fifty percent of
its partners are German. The second-largest German firm in the German
market, CMS Hasche Sigle (436 lawyers), has established a successful best-
friends network, which comprises nine top European firms. 66 The rest of
the top twelve are "traditional" German firms with a very strong focus on
the German market (Beiten Burkhardt, Luther, N6rr Stiefenhofer Lutz,
Hengeler Mueller, Gleiss Lutz). Some of these firms have created "best-
friend relationships": examples include the alliances between Gleiss Lutz,
Herbert Smith (U.K.), Stibbe (Benelux), and Cuatresecas (Spain); as well as
Hengeler Muller, Davis, Polk & Wardwell (U.S.), Slaughter and May
(U.K.), and Uria & Men~ndez (Spain). Thus, the top level in the German
legal market is not dominated by a specific type of law firm (U.K. or U.S.-
based big law firm); rather it can be characterized as a mix of different
types of firms.
A comparison of some key figures between top German and top U.K.
firms shows surprising results. Firms like Hengeler Mueller, Gleiss Lutz
and Nurr Stiefenhofer Lutz, some of the most exclusive firms in the
German market, are much smaller than the top U.K. firms with regard to
size and turnover. However, all these firms have a profit per equity partner
("PEP") of over £500,000 (Hengeler: £582,800; Gleiss Lutz: £633,000;
Norr: £515,580).67 The PEP is smaller than that of large U.K. firms (e.g.,
Clifford Chance, £810,000; Freshfields, £830,000),68 but partners in U.K.
firms usually have more associates in their teams than German firms.
Consequently, it can be assumed that the profitability of these firms is
comparable to the profitability of large U.K. firms.
A look at the next level of law firms shows a completely different
picture. There are twelve firms with 100 to 200 lawyers (among them five
U.K. or U.S. firms). The rest of the top sixty have between forty and
ninety-eight lawyers. In this group we also find U.K. or U.S. firms that
have opened smaller offices in Germany (DLA Piper, eighty-seven lawyers;
Jones Day, sixty-seven lawyers; Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, sixty
lawyers), but the vast majority are "traditional" German firms. 6 9 Many of
Linklaters (England).
65 Linklaters, History, http://www.linklaters.com/locations/germany/english/newsand
deals/newspresslist.asp?localnavigationid=1425 (last visited May 1, 2008).
66 CMS Legal Services, http://www.cmslegal.com (last visited May 1, 2008).
67 Husnara Begum and Helen Power, Gleiss Lutz Emerges as the Top Domestic
Performer, But the Foreign Firms Still Dominate, THE LAWYER, 2005, available at http://
www.thelawyer.com/eurol 00/2005/germany.html.
68 The New Order: The UK 100 2006, THE LAWYER, 2006, available at http://www
.thelawyer.com/uk 100/archive/2006/tb_1-25.html.
69 JUVE, supra note 60.
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these firms have grown through mergers between different local firms and
their offices often operate as largely independent units. These firms are the
central advisers for midsized companies.
One explanation for the fact that we cannot observe a clear
Americanization of the German market is based on cultural attitudes which
resist being subsumed under Anglo-American managerial structures that
appear far removed from the collegial practice of law. This explains why
many of the larger midsized firms in Germany have refused to merge with
U.S. or U.K. firms. In addition, these firms have a very high standing in the
German market and they have no desire to become a junior partner in an
international alliance. Other central aspects are related to more practical
problems that result from the specific characteristics of the German
economy. First of all, Germany, as well as the United States, has a very
strong local economy. Midsized companies traditionally play a very
important role for the German economy and most of these firms operate
across borders. In addition, Germany is a federal state with numerous
important business centers all over the country. Frankfurt, Hamburg, and
Munich are the most important legal markets. Berlin still plays a crucial
role as the federal capital, even though several large firms have closed their
offices here in recent years. However, economic centers are located all over
the country. Consequently, cities like Stuttgart, Dilsseldorf, K6ln,
Hannover, Bremen, Dresden, and Leipzig have become major legal markets
as well.
The Hannover area (capital of the state of Lower Saxony) is a good
example for this development. This area has a strong automotive sector
with Volkswagen, the fifth largest car manufacturer in the world, at its
center. Numerous large and midsized suppliers are located in the region.
Some of these companies, like Continental, have opened foreign factories
all over the world and have become multinational players themselves.
Hannover is also one of the most important locations in the German
insurance sector (HDI Gerling, Hannover Riick, Talanx), and the most
important location in Europe for industrial fairs (CEBIT, Hannover
Industrie Messe). The legal market is largely controlled by midsized firms
with very strong links to regional politics and economy. The leading firm
in this area has approximately ninety lawyers nationwide and less than
thirty lawyers in the Hannover office. Nevertheless, international work is
part of the daily routine of the firm. Another traditional firm in the region,
Suhren Peltzer Meinecke (fifth in the region), with less than twenty lawyers
has advised regional midsized companies and banks for more than thirty
years. In the last seven years its new managing partner, a former associate
at Taylor Wessing, has developed a strong international practice in the area
of German-Spanish and German-Chinese commerce. Most of the firm's
clients remain midsized companies. Yet the firm also works for several
large foreign firms, among them top-100 Chinese companies, as well as
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Spanish and Chinese export insurance companies. Obviously, very large
and complex deals in this region, for example, the acquisition of VDO, a
former Siemens company, by Continental for approximately E I1 billion, are
carried out by large firms that are located outside the Hannover region. The
regional firms cannot provide the resources to carry out deals of this size.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of cross-border transactions is carried out by
large midsized firms and boutique firms specialized in international
commerce.
Even in very important legal markets such as Frankfurt, which is the
most important financial market in Germany, we can observe the continuing
influence of midsized firms and the establishment of many smaller law
firms with high levels of specialization (boutiques). Some firms have
developed a high level of specialization in specific areas of law. Others
have specialized in bilateral practice. Examples are Dolce & Lauda
(German-Italian business) and Schiller (German-Spanish business). Some
of these firms have started to position themselves in the European market.
E. Lawyers' Knowledge, Networks, and Legal Skills
U.S. law firms are, at bottom, supported by a large domestic law
market.7 ° Going global for them is dependent on the sustained development
of their original markets. The success of firms like Cravath and Wachtell
Lipton exemplifies the policy of primarily concentrating on their home
markets and using networks of overseas law firms to build their
international practices. U.K. firms have never had the luxury of a big
domestic market and have therefore sought work outside the United
Kingdom. The empire provided a conduit into profitable regions such as
the Middle East and Asia. Globalization has resulted in shifting polarities
with regions like the European Union, the North American Free Trade
Area, and Asia representing the bulk of foreign direct investment ("FDI")
flows in the world. In addition to the transactions that result from this FDI,
non-state disputing regimes have emerged, including those based with the
World Trade Organization and the World Bank.
One advantage traditionally enjoyed by American firms is their long
ties with clients in the investment banking industry.72  The major
investment banks that engage in the key capital markets deals are all
American, e.g., Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch. We
70 Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Services-Shifting Identities,
31 LAW AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1093, 1150 (2000).
71 International Law Firms: Trying To Get the Right Balance, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2004, at
26.
72 John Flood, Capital Markets, Globalisation and Global Elites, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCESSES, GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES 114-47 (Michael Likosky ed.,
2002).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:489 (2008)
know from law firm histories that these ties may go back more than 100
years. And strangely, though the lawyer-client relationship has undergone
something of a change in recent years-from one-stop shop to transactional
relations, some of these particular ties have endured.
While some firms have been able to rely on these traditional ties, the
changes in the business landscape brought about by mergers and
acquisitions, restructurings and so forth, have made lawyer-client relations
more tentative. In-house counsels are stricter about legal budgets, asking
law firms to commit to beauty parades to obtain work.73 Law firms have to
market themselves forcefully and enlist the aid of the state in opening
international legal markets for them.74
There is intense competition among law firms for international or
transnational work. Law firms actively promote their country's law as the
best vehicle for business transactions. The area of capital markets work
displays this clearly. The main sources of finance in the international arena
are the United States (New York) and the United Kingdom (London). 5
Thus most transactions would be undertaken either in New York state law
or English law or a hybrid form of both. Increasingly global transactions
involve numbers of different jurisdictions and each must be incorporated
into a form that enables either New York or English law to coordinate the
range. Some of our informants claimed that the crucial feature was not so
much choice of law but rather choosing the English languageover others.
Acting globally while thinking locally is reasonable as long as law firms are
not overly constrained by local culture.
The crucial question for large continental European law firms is to
what extent are international law firms merely exporting (imposing) English
or New York law as opposed to engaging in the practice of local law? The
large law firm's core alliance is with the Anglo-American nexus. It
therefore has to create ways to tie in local norms to the overarching pattern
devised in English and American law. Finding ways of dovetailing
sometimes incommensurable systems has led to the globalization of legal
education and training. Young lawyers from large firms outside the Anglo-
American nexus find it essential to take an LL.M. degree at a major
American or English law school; otherwise they will not be conversant with
global legal techniques.76 Reinforcement for this view is found within
73 John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in International
Business Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 53 (2007).
74 Stephen Mayson, Global Law Firms: A Strategy Looking for a Market, presented at
The Future of the Global Law Firm Symposium, Georgetown University Law Center, Center
for the Study of the Legal Profession, April 17-18, 2008 (paper on file with authors).
" Id. at 36.
76 John Flood, Legal Education, Globalization, and the New Imperialism, in THE LAW
SCHOOL-GLOBAL ISSUES, LOCAL QUESTIONS 127, 158 (Fiona Cownie ed., 1999); Carole
Silver, The Case Of The Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing The U.S. Legal Profession, 25
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intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, which usually
insist on their lawyers possessing master's degrees.
The situation for international midsized and boutique firms is
somewhat different. As mentioned before, the domestic market in Germany
in the area of midsized business is very large. Consequently, global
activities of most midsized firms are often based on their domestic work.
Midsized companies will usually not ask their law firms to participate in
"beauty parades" but they have started to cooperate with different firms in
different areas of law. This has led to greater competition in the market and
the development of stronger specializations in this field. Today, many
larger midsized firms still consider themselves as general-practice firms but
at the same time they put a strong emphasis on the development of core
competencies in specific areas of law, in particular international law which
is the fastest growing area of work for midsized firms.
International transactions carried out by midsized firms, like real estate
projects, supplier contracts, or joint ventures, are obviously less complex
and involve smaller amounts than the transactions supported by larger
firms. Some areas of work of big law firms are strongly linked to specific
business or finance centers like New York or London, which explains why
most transactions in this area are carried out under New York or English
law. In contrast, key players involved in transactions carried out by
midsized firms are not always found in these particular locations, which
makes it much more important to adapt the legal service to the legal,
cultural, and social particularities. Many standard contracts used in this
context have been developed in the United States or United Kingdom (joint
venture, franchising, etc.). Nevertheless, these contracts have to be adapted
to local specialities and the function of the contract depends strongly on the
context in which it is used.
The structures developed by firms to operate in the international
context and the quality of their work varies strongly among different
midsized firms. Some firms have no or little experience with
international transactions and they will also communicate this to the client
and not take up an international mandate. However, many midsized firms
that do not have any experience at the international level will also try to
keep their clients and falsely represent to have international competence and
experience.
Due to the relatively small size of midsized firms it is almost
impossible for these firms to develop a general expertise in international
work. Most firms will have to specialize in particular areas of law or
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1039, 1084; Ralf Rogowski, Auditors and Lawyers in Germany: Co-
Evolution, Not Competition, 1 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 13, 29 (1994); Glenn Morgan & Sigrid
Quack, Institutional Legacies and Firm Dynamics: The Growth and Internationalization of
UK and German Law Firms, 26 ORG. STUD. 1765, 1785 (2005).
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particular countries. Competence and experience in different areas of
international law will usually not be attributed to the law firm but to
specific lawyers in the firm. Because of the high relevance of context-
factors it is essential for lawyers to be knowledgeable about foreign laws,
rules and practices of particular foreign jurisdictions. In addition,
interaction in an international context will pose major problems if the
lawyer is not aware of cultural and social differences and different
negotiation styles.77 The ability to "bridge the cultural gap" is a necessary
prerequisite for this type of work.78 Thus, a firm that works in German-
Spanish business will probably not recruit someone with an LL.M. from a
top American university but rather recruit lawyers with work experience
and an LL.M. from Spain or even Spanish lawyers. This is the only way for
these firms to bridge gaps between different legal systems. 79 Even if the
work of midsized firms is more standardized than the work of big law firms
creative lawyering skills80 are of crucial importance to develop new legal
argumentation and to create new flexible solutions. The interrelatedness
between legal and non-legal fields also makes it necessary to provide
knowledge in different non-legal fields.8 '
The central problem for medium-sized law firms is their organization
in the international sphere. While most large law firms opened offices in
different countries or established long-standing relationships with foreign
large law firms, medium-sized law firms lack the financial capacity to
expand abroad. The creation of networks between independent law firms
has been one possible answer to this problem. But most authors believe
that some of these networks are just paper entities, "designed to look good
on the letterheads. 82  If the networks are large, it will be difficult to
evaluate the quality of a foreign law firm.83 A law firm will take a high risk
if it has to carry out an important deal for a major client and is forced to
77 Sunwolf, Communication Between Legal Cultures: Strategies, Perceptions and Beliefs
of American Lawyers Who Practice International Litigation (1997)(unpublished paper, on
file with authors); Rona Mears, Contracting in Mexico: A Legal and Practical Guide to
Negotiating and Drafting, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737, 770 (1993); Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio
Lop~z-Ayll6n, Communicaci6n Entre Culturas Juridicas: Los Panels Binacionales Del
Capitulo XIX del TLCAN, in VIII REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 255 (1997).
78 Roger Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational Requirements for Law
Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TUL. L. REv. 443, 447 (1989);
Flood, Megalawyering, supra note 54.
79 Peter Roorda, The Internationalization of the Practice of Law, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 141, 145 (1993); Skordaki & Flood, supra note 32,
80 McBarnet, Legal Creativity, supra note 24.
81 Peter Gardner, A Role For the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: Adding
Value to the Client's Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv.
17, 26 (2003).
82 Abel, Transnational Law Practice, supra note 40 at 747.
83 Id. at 746. See also Flood, Megalawyering, supra note 54.
Stabilization of Transnational Business
28:489 (2008)
cooperate with an unknown law firm in another country that is part of a
large network. As a consequence, midsized law firms try to build smaller
networks with a high social density. The networks are often limited to a
few members, because otherwise it is not possible to establish frequent and
intense contact between the firns. Thus, it can be assumed that personal
networks with lawyers and other key players are of higher importance than
in the area of large firms because office networks or formal alliances do not
exist.
The influence of the Anglo-American way of lawyering in the
European market at the level of midsized and boutique law firms is
probably smaller than at the top level. The letterheads of the larger midsized
firms and boutique firms show that these firms have recruited associates
with international education and work experience. But most of these firms
have been involved in cross-border work for decades, they have strong links
to other key players in the field, and they have developed their own ways of
international lawyering.
In the next section we present a series of case studies of cross-border
transactions involving large and medium-sized firms. The first is the sale of
an office building owned by a Japanese consortium in London to a
company based in the British Virgin Islands, the second is the sale of a
large African mobile telephone company to a Middle Eastern telecoms
company, the third is the promotion of a construction project by a German
company in Spain, and the fourth is litigation between automobile
companies in Spain and Germany. All the cases have cross-border elements
and make extensive demands on the lawyers' knowledge and network
relationships. Despite how well-resourced the lawyers' own knowledge
banks are, they must possess the capacity to know when-in terms of risk
management and deal structure-it is necessary to avail themselves of the
expertise of other lawyers outside their own jurisdiction. As the case studies
show, this is easier for some than others.
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. Selling a London Office Building
The £220 million transaction involved a large, fully-leased London
office building. The building was being sold by the U.K. nominee of a joint
venture of Japanese banks who were selling off their portfolio of European
property assets. The purchaser was a former U.K. public limited property
company ("PLC") that went private and moved offshore to the Caribbean,
referred to as "XX." It is considered to be one of the most sophisticated
players in the property market dealing in hedging and property derivatives.
The purchase was being funded by another syndicate of Japanese banks.
The purchase was a joint venture between XX and an Australian
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pension fund. XX wanted the deal done in a combination of English, as the
lead, British Virgin Islands ("BVI"), Australian, Jersey, and Japanese law.
The lawyer for XX took the lead in drafting the documentation used.
Initially he expected the transaction to take around several weeks, but the
complexity of it combined, especially because of tax difficulties, with the
respective needs of local laws meant that ultimately it took six months to
complete.
Not all of the local laws played significant parts. To make the joint
venture work BVI law was used to set up a special purpose vehicle to hold
the assets of the transaction. For XX this was easily done for it undertook
between 20 and 30 large property transactions a year, which has resulted in
good relationships between XX and the BVI regulators. Jersey was where
the bank accounts would be located; again offshore.
The key element in these types of transactions is minimizing the tax
burdens that arise. Since XX is offshore, it is protected from the U.K.
Revenue and Customs although not always. The transaction was expected
to take around four weeks to complete, but as the lead U.K. lawyer noted,84
For various tax reasons we had to go through five or six different
structures because they weren't working.85 The problem was that for
the Inland Revenue, tax domicile is a question of fact. Although XX
is offshore in the BVI where "management and control" are based, it
also has a large office in central London, which clouds the issue. All
my emails to XX had to appear to go to the BVI even though a
number of important decisions were being made in the London
office. The email trail had to be kept clear and direct so the Inland
Revenue wouldn't query anything.
8 6
XX used a big BVI law firm, which also had an office in London, for
its transactions which acted for both borrowers and lenders by setting up a
"Chinese Wall" in the firm. This is quite common in these classes of
transactions. The lead U.K. lawyer also said that despite the number of
different types of law involved, whoever was the originator in drafting the
document retained ultimate control over it: "the bits that relate to the
overseas element of the transaction are just slotted into the standard form of
the agreement., 8 7 He went on to say that there were two areas where he
asked the overseas lawyers to check carefully because each jurisdiction
would treat them differently and they were important in the United
84 Quotation taken from interviews with the lawyers involved in the real transaction after
which this case study has been modeled.
85 Structures are highly important for the satisfactory conclusion of a transaction. For a
more detailed discussion of this aspect, see Flood & Skordaki, supra note 32.
86 Interview with Lawyer A.
87 Id.
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Kingdom, namely, issues of financial assistance and inherent defects (e.g.,
insolvency, preferences), because in large part foreign counsel were content
to "sit back and allow the English counsel do it, but they must look at them
because they aren't described in the English document., 88 The insolvency
provisions were important because there was a special purpose vehicle
involved which must not be affected by any insolvency of the parent
company.
The trick for the lead lawyer was to have a local lawyer write an
opinion letter that would help coordinate the divergences so that the
problems appeared resolved, or write a section of the agreement so it could
be incorporated. For example, with the Australian pension fund there were
a number of issues surrounding superannuation funds and the lead lawyer
used the pension fund's own law firm to provide the necessary wording.
Another example concerns the requirements of the U.K. Land Registry on
signatures on release documents. Since the vendors were Japanese, a
Japanese bengoshi had to write a short opinion, which eventually ran to
three pages, on the validity of the two Japanese signatures. And for dealing
with the bank accounts being moved from the United Kingdom to Jersey, a
local firm was used to set them up.
The lead lawyer found he had difficulties with time differences.
Dealing with the BVI meant a difference of only five or six hours, which
was acceptable. With Australia, a time difference of ten hours, he was
compelled to make phone calls at 10 or 11 P.M. Being stretched between
the time zones of BVI and Australia was physically tiring.
Finally, there was the role of the banks in the construction of the loan
agreement. They are intimately involved because they provide the
financing for the transaction.
Banks are pretty good because what they do is provide a transaction
or document person, and often its someone who spent three or four
years in Allen and Overy. Some banks don't use lawyers, they use
people in the back office who have a good feel for it. And they can
provide a better service than lawyers, because there aren't many
areas in a loan agreement where you're going to be breaking the law,
so of more significance is the commercial deal you get. These
people have a list of all the transactions that have gone wrong and
the reasons why and they are much more focused and have a better
view of the documents. On the borrowers' side, it really depends on
the client. Some are professional, others ... well ... who knows
89
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lawyer as one who primarily concentrates on the deal, yet may do many of
them for particular clients. He put it this way:
There's a problem for transaction lawyers around risk management.
Transactions are individual items, but if you do a series of them for
the same client, then do you become an adviser as well? How much
do you have to recall about past deals? I always send an email to the
client near the end of the deal to say that you must check these
representations to ensure everything is covered. There is a strong
possibility that the client's lawyers could be held to know about
things and so not be able to state, "Oh, that was just a single deal." 90
Although the transaction took considerably longer than originally
anticipated-months rather than weeks-the crux of the matter was the
difficulty surrounding the tax issues. Gilson noted that this was an essential
element of transaction engineering.
B. Selling a Company
This transaction involved selling an African mobile phone company
with five million subscribers to one of the Middle East's largest telecoms
company ("ME"). ME was using this foray to make a stake as a global
telecoms player. The key lawyers were English law firms. ME approached
their lawyer's firm at one of the Middle Eastern offices. ME's law firm was
a "Magic Circle" law firm as was the vendor's.9' In this case the African
company asked an investment bank to run a controlled auction. The bank
sent letters, according to ME's lawyer, "to anyone they could think of who
might be interested in buying this business. Any mobile operator, any
telecoms company, and private equity houses as well.",92 Around 100
companies were approached with a rough outline of the deal. If they were
interested, they would be sent a confidentiality agreement. Out of those
contacted a smaller subset expressed interest and signed the confidentiality
agreement. They then received an information memorandum, a book of
several hundred pages, describing in detail the company, its share structures
and its financial information. The book was put together by the financial
advisers and lawyers. Because the business is telecoms, there were many
regulatory hurdles to overcome. This meant even the vendors would
organize a due diligence exercise. In addition, the vendors would provide,
through their lawyers, the initial documentation. They would ask for some
comments, but not too many. On this basis the potential bidders could
decide what they were to bid for and how much it might be worth.
90 Id.
91 See Flood, Megalawyering, supra note 54.
92 Interview with Lawyer B.
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The next stage was for the sellers to select, out of a field of ten to
twenty, four who would submit binding offers. This would go to a final
stage where two bidders would negotiate the final terms. The final sale
price was $3.4 billion. There is always a possibility that this kind of deal
can turn sour and fail to complete. In part this is due to the complexity of
the funding arrangements required to be in place for this size of transaction
to go through. These transactions usually involve leverage, i.e. other
people's money or debt, and therefore all types of guarantees have to be
arrayed, default conditions prepared for, and more. This particular
transaction was being funded by loans from four banks in the Middle East,
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the United States. If the sale were to
fail, the vendor's lawyers were running a parallel track with the sale to
place an initial public offering in the market. The hope was that it would be
redundant.
Although the operations were based in Africa the selling company was
headquartered in the Netherlands. No African country had the scale or
sophistication in its legal market to handle such a large transaction.
However, some local African law firms were used during the due diligence
process to monitor regulatory matters. Local contracts would be
investigated by the U.K. lawyers on the basis that the content would be the
issue-not the law-and that the content would be too complex for local
lawyers. Moreover, as English lawyers were used, they naturally used
English law. But as the lawyer remarked,
We need a lingua franca and that's English law. But actually what
the governing law of, say, a share acquisition agreement is doesn't
really matter that much. Because most of it is the terms which tend
to be pretty well identical, especially the commercial terms, whether
it's English, Dutch, French, German or Italian law.
9 3
In this transaction, even though there were sixteen operating subsidiaries,
what was actually bought was a single block of shares in a Dutch company.
The share purchase agreement was done under English law while various
minor ancillary elements, such as the transfer documents because they were
Dutch shares, had to be done under Dutch law. The lawyer said that usually
share purchase agreements would be done under local law, but this was an
exception because although the company was Dutch, the business was pan-
African and there were more than 100 shareholders who came from a
variety of locations. And the purchasers came from different places, so
English law provided a common site. In this respect the variety of laws in
play were significant as far as the regulatory issues were concerned but to
the overall structure of the transaction they were relatively insignificant.
93 id.
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The transaction therefore was a combination of relatively simple
company law issues, complex regulatory matters, and complicated
financing and tax issues, but one which law firms are typically used to
carrying out. The lawyers' tasks were to bring these together into a set of
coherent structures which enabled the parties to complete their transactions
under a range of headings that included private and state concerns. It
helped that the lawyers from the different law firms were used to working
with each other and that they were used to working with the investment
banks. The enduring institutional relationships and networks were a vital
key to the success of the transaction.
C. Investing in Foreign Construction Projects
This case involves a project promoted by a German construction firm,
which involved the construction of three apartment parks in Mallorca. The
German construction firm cooperated with a German bank which was in
charge of the sale of the apartments. This bank had long-standing ties with
the firm and it recommended the law firm to the construction company.
Because of the sensitivity of this type of work, reputation is considered a
crucial factor in the construction business. The only way to get this type of
work, which is very lucrative for a midsized law firm, is through
recommendation of other construction firms or banks which are doing these
projects.
Typically the construction company, which has no or only little
experience in the Spanish market, expects a wide range of services from its
law firm which includes legal and non-legal aspects. The first part of the
work was the formation of a new corporate entity, which incorporated legal,
tax, and non-legal issues such as evaluating the trustworthiness of the
Spanish company. In the project, the law firm developed a specific
corporate structure which consisted of the foundation of a Spanish limited
company, which would be responsible for the construction work and sale of
the apartments, and also a German GmbH & Co. KG (limited company and
a company limited partnership) to promote sales in Germany. This solution
guaranteed limited liability in Spain (legal issue), a relatively low taxation
burden (tax issue) and high acceptance on the Spanish market, which
facilitated the cooperation with local construction firms and banks
(economic and relational issues). The company also had long-standing
business relationships with local accounting firms.
The law firm helped the construction company to purchase land and it
participated in the negotiations with the seller. When a dispute arose with
the owner because of a mortgage on the property which had to be paid out,
the firm sent a lawyer from its Barcelona office to settle the case with the
owner. In this situation the law firm was able to use its bi-national
structure, which consisted of the availability of lawyers in different
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locations, who are able to solve conflicts by taking the particularities of the
situation as well as social and cultural differences of the parties into
account. The firm analyzed existing building law in Mallorca, established
contact with the local administration, resolved insurance issues, and
participated in negotiations with a German bank for the financing of the
project. It checked the creditworthiness of the other construction firms
involved in the project, drafted and controlled construction and architecture
contracts. In addition, it handled all private sales contracts with final
customers. The sale of apartments often involves the handling of small and
large conflicts with final customers due to technical defects, desired extra
changes to plans, etc. The firm sent one of its Barcelona lawyers to
Mallorca to control the construction work. He also spent about seventy
percent of his time handling customers' complaints which made it possible
to settle all conflicts on the spot.
The firm had extensive experience of this type of work and enjoyed
high standing in the construction business because it offered this full-range
service. Although the project was embedded in a legal structure consisting
of many different contracts, the client tried to avoid any type of judicial
confrontation with other partners because judicial procedures would have
endangered the realization of the project. Consequently, the main task of
the law firm was not to enforce contractual claims in court, but to find
extra-legal solutions to conflicts. A major part of the firm's work consisted
of preventative actions, like the detailed analysis of the solvency and the
reputation of possible partners for its clients.
D. Suing Across Borders
The weakness of the legal system at the international level
significantly limits the scope for litigation in cross-border conflicts. As a
consequence, law firms have to evaluate the costs and risks of litigation and
other forms of dispute resolution, which are almost impossible to conduct
without prior experience in this field. Litigation is usually not an
appropriate solution when small amounts are at stake,94 because the costs
will often exceed the benefits.
By contrast, in complex transactions the amounts at stake are usually
very high, but lawyers avoid state courts because their capacity to handle
conflicts that arise in such situations is poor. Here the lawyers were
planning to pursue arbitration if settlement became impossible since that
offered the potential for a rational result.
Nevertheless, litigation is a common tool for midsized law firms to
solve cross-border conflicts. The following case involves a contract
between a Spanish supplier ("S") in the automotive industry and a German
94 Gessner, supra note 13; SOSA, supra note 15.
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supplier ("G"). S claimed from G the amount of E 117,000 for the delivery
of screws for the automotive industry. G refused to pay the contract price
arguing that it had a counter-claim in the amount of approximately
E130,000 against S resulting from a prior delivery. The screws sent in the
prior delivery suffered from a brittle fracturing that was produced from the
induction of hydrogen. The defective screws had to be removed from
motors that were already delivered to a large car manufacturer.
The central technical problem of the conflict between the parties
involved the question whether the brittle fracturing was the result of a
deficient heat treatment, or whether the danger of brittle fracturing was
unavoidable due to the particular material, coating, and strength that was
ordered by G. The German lawyers for S asked expert opinions from a
German and a Spanish specialist. However, the experts from different
countries provided different results.
The case also involved several problems related to international and
foreign law. If the parties do not select the applicable law the Convention
on the International Sales of Goods ("CISG") applies in the particular case.
However, the general conditions of G's contract contained a clause in which
the application of the CISG was excluded. One of the central points of
discussion was the question whether G's general conditions were integrated
into the contract or not. Even if this was a standard problem in cross-border
conflicts, there was not much caselaw on this topic, which made it
necessary for the lawyers to develop new legal arguments. In addition, the
case involved several questions related to Spanish law.
The situation in this case, which is very typical for commercial
conflicts, lead to a shift of responsibility from the state towards the private
parties involved in the litigation process. The court did not have the time or
capacity to handle international cases. In addition, it had to ask for several
expert opinions with regard to the technical as well as the legal problems
involved in the case. However, this can also lead to difficulties, because the
quality of the experts often varies. In addition, only few institutions in
Germany are able to provide expert opinions on questions of foreign law
and the involvement of an expert usually costs additional time. In contrast,
the law firms involved have the necessary resources to deal with these
problems. The legal arguments provided by lawyers are much more
extensive than in national litigation. Even very simple problems of
international private law and international civil procedure are discussed in
detail, because most lawyers assume that judges do not have a lot of
knowledge in this area and will not be able to invest enough time to
examine all relevant legal aspects.
Time constraints also played a crucial role in this case. First of all, the
taking of evidence would be very cost- and time-intensive. In addition, it
was almost certain that the defeated party would appeal the judgment,
which meant that a final result would not be obtained for at least two years.
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The parties were able to settle the case in the first hearing within ten
minutes. The judge summarized the facts of the case and presented a
preliminary evaluation of the case, which involved short statements with
regard to the burden of proof and a risk analysis. The parties agreed that G
had to pay an amount of E70,000 to S.
The lawyer is not working independently from the state legal system
because he is within the shadow of the law. But the role of the state is
decreasing because it could not provide an adequate solution for the parties.
The role of the state in this situation was limited to the creation of a fear of
possible sanctions for both parties which created an important incentive to
settle the case.9 5  Nevertheless, the extensive legal and technical
argumentation prepared by the lawyers provided the central basis for the
settlement. The detailed discussion of legal and technical problems made it
possible to point out the central risks for both parties.
The success of a settlement in these types of commercial conflicts
depends crucially on the lawyer's ability to present an overview of all legal
and non-legal aspects of the conflict and to integrate them into the
discussion process. The solution appears to be a legal solution because it is
created by lawyers. But in reality it involved legal and technical aspects of
the case, a risk analysis, as well as the economic factors. However, the
appearance of a legal solution is necessary for the parties to accept the
settlement.
In many situations the lawyers will even have to create completely
new legal structures for the handling of new types of problems which have
never appeared before. This happened in a case where the German law firm
was told to sue a Spanish lawyer for professional negligence. In contrast to
national contexts, there is no case law on liability of lawyers in cross-border
litigation in most European countries. 96 In addition, it was unlikely that a
Spanish judge would have the resources and competence to handle the case
95 This argument is derived from Eric Posner, who assumes that the expectation of
substantial costs in case of a judicial conflict is sufficient to deter opportunistic behavior.
ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMS (Harvard Univ. Press 2000).
96 The question of lawyer liability has been discussed in German literature. See, e.g.,
Oliver Sieg, Internationale Anwaltshaftung: die Haftung des deutschen Rechtsanwalts bei
der Anwendung auslandischen Rechts und bei der Zusammenarbeit mit auslindischen
Rechtsanwalten (1996); Christoph Louven, Die Hafiung des deutschen Rechtsanwalts im
internationalen Mandat, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 1050 (1997); Horst Zugeh6r, Gero Fischer,
Oliver Sieg, & Heinz Schlee, Handbuch der Anwaltshaftung (2006); Gottfried Raiser, Die
Haftung des deutschen Rechtsanwalts bei grenzuiberschreitender Titigkeit, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2049 (1991). However, the number of court decisions is
limited: Oberlandesgericht.Hamm, DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 460
(1997); Cour d'appel de Nimes, 72 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 259
(1983); Oberlandesgericht Bamberg, 43 MONATSSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES RECHT 542 (1989);
Le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Ill JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 583
(1984); BGH, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 564 (1972).
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diligently. The level of unpredictability of court decisions is very high
because the law only exists as raw material so that the stabilization of
expectations at the level of the legal system is virtually unattainable. 97 In
such situations it is essential to consider the case law of other countries and
to develop the legal fundamentals of lawyer liability in the international
context on this basis, which did not exist in Spain. The client would be
reliant on his law firm, which would have to assume the role of the judge to
develop new case law. This is delicate and time-consuming work that
requires intense research and legal creativity. At the same time, a high level
of sensitivity is needed in order to avoid offending the judge, which could
lead to the dismissal of the suit. The high importance which is attributed to
the person of a particular lawyer is displayed by the client's desire to have a
particular lawyer from the law firm. This was the head of the Spanish
department of the law firm with whom he shared a long-standing personal
relationship and who had advised his company in other matters.
This case is also a good example of the intense cooperation between
international medium-sized law firms which is not feasible without prior
experience. Lawyers from the different offices kept in close contact and
their responsibilities were strictly defined. The law firm established a team
of four lawyers (two from one of the German offices and two from the
Spanish offices) to handle the case. The Spanish lawyers were in charge of
the court procedures and the German lawyers prepared the facts of the case
and corresponded with the client. The main creative part of the work was
carried out by the German lawyers who collected case law on lawyer
liability from different countries and tried to develop a general
jurisprudence which could be presented to the Spanish judge. The Spanish
lawyers were in charge of adapting the general theory to the Spanish
context within existing Spanish caselaw on lawyer liability in domestic
cases which was almost non-existent.
V. CONCLUSION
Our case studies show that lawyers strive to stabilize clients'
expectations at the level of the law firm. Leakages from this level to that of
the state system are tantamount to an admission of failure on the part of the
lawyer. Judges, courts and other state tribunals are by their nature
unpredictable. Points of law are wild cards that can turn any way. The key
to successful transactions is to retain their conduct within the system of
private ordering through the construction of enabling structures. Private
ordering necessarily operates within the shadow of the law and courts, but
those shadows must never be permitted to darken these relations.
Lawyers' work connects across a number of areas including legal,
97 McBarnet, Legal Creativity, supra note 24.
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relationships, networks, knowledge, and national boundaries. Its purpose is
to create enabling structures that facilitate the construction of transactions.
At this level there is almost parity between the work of the law firm and
that of the state. The role of enabling structures can be perceived to
compensate for the wildness of the market. The state endows the law firm
to act on its behalf where it has neither the competence nor the reach when
transactions straddle national boundaries.98 Thus legitimacy is assured.
Scale is important. There is a distinction between the roles of the large
law firms and the midsized firms. The resources available to the large law
firms are vast. They have large numbers of lawyers in offices in the main
commercial and financial centers of the world. Even if they have not
internationalized in this manner, their established networks of best friends
enable them to operate in a functionally similar manner. Large law firms
are intimately connected to the major investment banks, other professional
service firms, and the credit rating agencies.99 Sophisticated clients are
aware of these resources and expect to capitalize on them when they hire
these law firms.
Clients know, in many situations, large law firms will provide stable
solutions based on the well-known and accepted principles of Anglo-
American law. And in cases where clients have the power to force the
selection of alternative legal systems (e.g. oil and gas contracts in Russia),
they are able to generate structures that limit the damage potential of these
choices. Even where such choices are forced upon parties, other aspects of
the transaction, especially financing, will of necessity involve the selection
of different jurisdictions which has the capability of diluting the exclusivity
of the host system.
Large law firms dominate because they are powerful institutions that
collaborate in the production of the many elements that combine to make
transactions possible. The vast majority of transactions are based on types
of standard documentation. Some is produced directly by law firms: the
experience of past deals. Others arise from participating in the production of
documents by international associations. The International Swaps and
Derivatives Association ("ISDA") produces a series of master agreements
98 This assumes, perhaps, mistakenly that both law firms and states act rationally. This
assumption is questionable given what we know about the structure of law firms and states.
To perceive them as connected and unified in purpose fails to accord with reality, which is
that these institutions are at best a series of Montesquieu structures, to borrow Lazega's term,
that is interlocking but independent niches in competition for scarce resources. See
EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF
COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
99 Cf Roy Suddaby, Post Professionalism: How Multidisciplinary Accounting Firms are
Reshaping Institutions of Professionalim, paper presented at The Future of the Global Law
Firm Symposium, Georgetown University Law Center, Center for the Study of the Legal
Profession, April 17-18, 2008 (on file with authors).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:489 (2008)
and protocols, which are constantly updated, that are the bedrock for all
such deals. Law firms and banks actively participate in the ISDA to ensure
that the documentation meets the needs of their clients. 00 This accounts for
the translation competence of lawyers as they bring the world of mundane
transactions into a more rarefied legal discourse and structure.10 ' It is the
equivalent of de-contextualizing idiomatic legal wording to construct a
transcendental core.'0 2 Ultimately it creates a path dependency which is
difficult to avoid.
Midsized law firms have fewer resources available to them compared
to large law firms. Their cross-border reach is frequently bi-national which
limits their capabilities to clients. They have to rely more strongly on
associations, linkages, networks, and affiliations to attract a greater range of
cross-border work. Co-optation by the large Anglo-American law firms is a
constant threat, and one that these types of firms within continental Europe
are resisting. Consequently, their clients are smaller businesses and
companies than those of the large law firms. 10 3 This means the level of
transactions carried out by medium-sized firms is of a different nature than
that of the large firms. However, similar to the field of large firms we can
observe a shift of responsibility from the state to private actors The lawyers
become transaction cost managers, who decide on the use and combination
of different mixes to solve cross-border conflicts or to realize international
transactions. Legal and non-legal instruments are not used alternatively,
they are combined.
Luhmann's work directs us to the role of stabilizing expectations by
creating typified solutions that work in many contexts. These are created
by law firms especially in situations where the state is weak. In doing this
law firms reduce the transaction costs to clients by minimizing such costs
that accrue through tax burdens and regulation thereby creating value in the
transactions, according to Gilson. In the case of conflicts, lawyers exercise
their influence to create alternative solutions that do not leave the sphere of
influence of private actors. These structures, embedded in the
1oo See Allen & Overy: An Introduction to the Documentation of OTC [Over the Counter
Derivatives Documentation], http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/documentation of derivatives
.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
101 Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 15-48
(Maureen Cain & Christine Harrington eds., 1994). One of the key questions that arises
from this discussion, but not entertained here, is the extent to which the production of these
documents is in fact firm-specific capital-the intellcctual property of the law firm-or the
product of the lawyer who can then transfer it to other firms.
102 Michael Smets, Aligning Local Expertise in Cross-National Legal Work: Translations
in a Global Law Firm's Banking Group (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
103 However, banks sometimes use their influence and power to persuade clients to
switch from their customary law firms to the large law firms which hope to retain them.
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documentation enable the life course of the transaction to assume a
predictable trajectory accessible to all the parties. Lawyers and law firms
tame the naked power of the market by assessing and managing risk,
delivering to clients predictable and calculable outcomes. Despite Weber's
claims that only the state was capable of delivering stable expectations
structures in capitalist economies, we have demonstrated that modernity
requires more sophisticated solutions that derive from institutions outside
the state that have effectively pierced the state's monopoly on norm
production.
A fundamental question put by Abel and Lewis in their study of
lawyers was what is that lawyers actually do? 104  We believe we are
showing the kinds of roles lawyers adopt and the types of activities they
engage in. Future research must take account of not only the organizational
aspects of lawyers and professional service firms but also their work. For
ultimately it is their work that defines them and gives them their identity.
104 Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back Into the Sociology of
Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 478 (Richard L. Abel & Philip
S.C. Lewis eds., 1989).
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